



# AutoAdd

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# Connected Things



# Web Connected Things



# Internet of (connected) Things



A system where the **Internet is connected to the physical world via ubiquitous sensors**. (Kevin Ashton 1999)

# EkoBus



# Amazon Alex / Echo



# Google Home



The advertisement features a white Google Home smart speaker on the left, displaying the Google logo and the text "Google Home". Below it is the slogan "Manage everyday tasks effortlessly". A horizontal line of icons includes a clock, a lightbulb, a thermometer, a circular dial with "74", a fork and knife, and a flower bouquet. To the right of the speaker is a smaller, white Google Nest Learning Thermostat. The background is a light green color with abstract brown and grey line art.

Google Home

Manage everyday tasks effortlessly

74



# Amazon Alexa Lighter Side



Source: Mark Parisi, Off The mark

# Increased Risks!

Who is the culprit?

- ▶ Software Control
  - ▶ Everything turning in computer
  - ▶ Enormous power and flexibility, but brings insecurities
- ▶ Interconnection
  - ▶ Vulnerabilities in one lead to attacks against others
  - ▶ Ransomware attack
- ▶ Autonomy
  - ▶ Buying/selling stocks, driverless cars
  - ▶ Effects of attacks can take effect immediately, automatically, and ubiquitously.


# Add a device to Network

- ▶ Manual bootstrap
  - ▶ Discovery
  - ▶ Registration
  - ▶ Key Setup
  - ▶ Configuration
- ▶ Can we minimize or eliminate user actions during bootstrap??



# Let's ***autoAdd***

- ▶ Add the device and let it bootstrap itself
- ▶ But Wait!!
  - ▶ How to know
    - ▶ The identity/authenticity of the device?
    - ▶ If device is compromised or not?
    - ▶ The identity of the network/domain?
    - ▶ If the domain is the correct one?




# Prior Approaches

- ▶ TOFU (Trust on First Use) [RFC7435]
  - ▶ TOFU calls for accepting and storing a public key or credential associated with an asserted identity, without authenticating that assertion.
  - ▶ Subsequent communication that is authenticated using the cached key or credential is secure against an MiTM attack, if such an attack did not succeed during the vulnerable initial communication.

# Prior Approaches

- ▶ Resurrecting Duckling [Stajano99theresurrecting]<sup>\*</sup>
  - ▶ Imprinting
  - ▶ Device recognises as its owner the first entity that sends it a secret key
  - ▶ Stay faithful to its owner for rest of life (loyalty!!)
    - ▶ EoL: Reset the software or Dispose the device
    - ▶ Transfer of control to another owner

\* <https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~fms27/papers/1999-StajanoAnd-duckling.pdf>



# Prior Approaches


- ▶ Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030]
  - ▶ The client initiates a TLS-secured HTTP session with an EST server.
  - ▶ A specific EST service is requested based on a portion of the URI used for the session.
  - ▶ The client and server authenticate each other.
  - ▶ The client verifies that the server is authorized to serve this client.
  - ▶ The server verifies that the client is authorized to make use of this server and the request that the client has made.
  - ▶ The server acts upon the client request.




# BRSKI

- ▶ Pledge discovers a communication channel to a Registrar.
- ▶ Pledge identifies itself. This is done by presenting an X.509 IDevID credential to the discovered Registrar (via the Proxy) in a TLS handshake. (The Registrar credentials are only provisionally accepted at this time)
- ▶ Pledge requests to Join the discovered Registrar using a voucher request.
- ▶ Registrar sends the voucher request to the MASA (manufacturer). URL of MASA can be in the voucher request or embedded in Registrar.
- ▶ MASA sends the voucher which is passed to pledge.
- ▶ Pledge verifies the voucher and imprints to the registrar by send voucher status telemetry.
- ▶ Registrar verifies the voucher and enrols the pledge to the domain

# BRSKI



# EAP-NooB



Source: Mohit Shetty; [https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/group/close/edge-computing-2016/lib/slides/tuomas\\_aura.pdf](https://www.cs.helsinki.fi/group/close/edge-computing-2016/lib/slides/tuomas_aura.pdf)

# AutoAdd



Manufacturer  
or  
Seller

Dig\_Invoice = DigSignM {IDevID,  
PubKey: [R1, R2, .., Rn]}



Device



Registrar



MASA

Embed DigInvoice


DigInvoice

Verify Manufacturer Signature

Acceptance Note

Signed Acceptance Note

Verify Registrar Signature  
using public key in the digital invoice



Thank you.